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Ampliﬁcation of future energy demand growth
due to climate change
Bas J. van Ruijven 1,2,3, Enrica De Cian4 & Ian Sue Wing3
Future energy demand is likely to increase due to climate change, but the magnitude depends
on many interacting sources of uncertainty. We combine econometrically estimated
responses of energy use to income, hot and cold days with future projections of spatial
population and national income under ﬁve socioeconomic scenarios and temperature
increases around 2050 for two emission scenarios simulated by 21 Earth System Models
(ESMs). Here we show that, across 210 realizations of socioeconomic and climate scenarios,
vigorous (moderate) warming increases global climate-exposed energy demand before
adaptation around 2050 by 25–58% (11–27%), on top of a factor 1.7–2.8 increase above
present-day due to socioeconomic developments. We ﬁnd broad agreement among ESMs
that energy demand rises by more than 25% in the tropics and southern regions of the USA,
Europe and China. Socioeconomic scenarios vary widely in the number of people in low-
income countries exposed to increases in energy demand.
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Energy use is one of the human systems most directlyexposed to changes in the climate1,2. Rising ambient tem-peratures are expected to increase hot season cooling
demand3 and could decrease cold season heating demand across
multiple economic sectors (see deﬁnition of economic sectors for
this study in Supplementary Note 1)4,5, as well as increase agri-
culture’s demand for irrigation during crop-growing seasons6.
Population expansion, economic growth, shifts in the sectoral
composition of economies, behavior of individuals and organi-
zations, and the pace of technological development are multiple
sources of uncertainty that will interact to determine future
demand of different energy sources across regions7. Layered on
top of this are the additional uncertainties in the timing and
intensity of future temperature changes—both at the global level,
driven by trajectories of global greenhouse gas emissions and
radiative forcing, and at ﬁner geographic scales, determined by
the effects on future regional climates.
Identifying the relative magnitudes of these uncertainties, their
shapes, and interactions is very relevant to policy makers, who
need to make decisions with decadal consequences today. To
characterize the interactions among these multiple sources of
uncertainty, we leverage on the new socioeconomic (Shared
Socioeconomic Pathway, SSPs) and climate scenarios (Repre-
sentative Concentration Pathways, RCPs)8, and combine
empirically derived reduced-form responses of sectoral energy
demand by fuel with climatological exposures and socioeconomic
variables. The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways and Representa-
tive Concentration Pathways are a set of socioeconomic and GHG
emission scenarios that have been developed by the research
community at the request of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) and that are used to make scenario-based
mitigation and impacts studies more comparable across the
literature.
We follow a top–down methodology as described in Swan and
Ugursal (2009)9, increasingly being used as a computationally
efﬁcient alternative10–13 to process-based simulation models14–17.
Engineering bottom-up models are generally applied to speciﬁc
countries or regions to simulate energy performance of speciﬁc
buildings or building archetypes, and to forecast speciﬁc end
uses in the near term18. Top–down models do not articulate
end-use services, but rely on aggregate national statistics and
macroeconomic drivers. When extending the time horizon to
the long term, bottom-up models also face the issue of techno-
logical and behavioral uncertainty, often being addressed through
stylized assumptions or reduced-form relationships between
the parameter of interest and income7. When aiming at
depicting global trends, the much greater complexity and data
requirements make it difﬁcult to develop high-quality global
bottom-up models19,20, and more aggregated or statistical
approaches are often preferred18. Top–down approaches can
capture the joint inﬂuence of uncertain future climatic and
socioeconomic conditions. Acknowledging parameter uncertainty
and stability over time21,22, they are increasingly being used
as computationally efﬁcient alternatives10–13,21 to characterize
global or aggregate patterns over the long run. A top–down
method makes it possible to develop ex ante climate-induced
potential impacts prior to any direct or indirect adjustment
induced by market interactions between future technological
or behavioral changes with energy supplies and the rest of the
economy through price changes23.
Our contribution is to develop climate-induced shocks that can
be subsequently included in Integrated Assessment Models
(IAMs) or Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models to
derive actual ex post energy consumption, which could be sub-
stantially moderated by substitution and price adjustments across
multiple markets14. These intervening adjustments ultimately
drive the economic impacts, such as changes in household
incomes and welfare. Their scale and scope depend on future
changes in structural, technological, and market characteristics
that top–down, empirically based approaches imperfectly
reﬂect, and that can be better analyzed using IAM or CGE
frameworks14–17.
We employ econometric estimates of the per-capita demand
for three different ﬁnal energy carriers associated with heating
and cooling (electricity, petroleum products, and natural gas,
see speciﬁc deﬁnition in Supplementary Note 1.) in four eco-
nomic sectors (agriculture, industry, residential, and commercial)
for tropical and temperate countries as a function of per-
capita gross domestic product (GDP) and exposure to hot
(>27.5 °C) and cold (<12.5 °C) days obtained from De Cian and
Sue Wing (2018)24—hereafter DCSW. We use cold and hot
days as an alternative indicator to heating and cooling degree
days, commonly computed using 18 °C as the comfort threshold,
a value suitable to temperate regions, but not to tropical coun-
tries. The cutoff values for deﬁning hot and cold days in our
study are based on the distribution of daily average temperature
across all world regions in temperate and tropical countries
and meet the need to capture low and high extremes while
guaranteeing a sufﬁcient number of observations. See Fig. 2
in DCSW24. We combine the income elasticities for energy
consumption with GDP per-capita projections from the SSPs.
We determine the climatic shocks by combining temperature
elasticities with the change in the number of hot and cold days
between now and 2050 from 21 Earth System Models (ESMs) and
two emission scenarios: RCPs 4.5 and 8.525–27. Finally, we com-
bine the baseline projections for energy consumption with the
impacts from temperature change and spatial population pro-
jections to derive the spatial patterns of changes in energy
demand.
We ﬁnd that vigorous (moderate) warming increases global
climate-exposed energy demand before adaptation around
2050 by 25–58% (11–27%), on top of the expansion due to
socioeconomic development. We ﬁnd broad agreement among
ESMs that energy demand increases by more than 25% in the
tropics and southern regions of the United States, Europe, and
China. The number of low-income people exposed to increased
energy needs varies greatly across SSPs.
Results
Baseline energy demand around 2050. We ﬁrst combined the
income elasticities for energy consumption from DCSW24 with
GDP per-capita projections from the Shared Socioeconomic
Pathway8,28,29 to construct ﬁve scenarios of baseline energy
demand in 2050 without climate-change impacts, based on pro-
jections of future spatially disaggregated population30,31 and
GDP growth for 183 countries32.
Across SSP scenarios, global population around 2050
ranges between 8.4 and 10 billion people, with modestly
varying geographic distribution that concentrates the bulk of
future population change in northern mid-to-low latitudes
(Fig. 1a). Per-capita GDP increases from 2010’s global aver-
age of $9763 to between 18,000 and $42,000, with geographic
patterns of economic development differing by SSP—especially
latitudinally (cf SSP4 in Fig. 1b). Combining these spatial
patterns with the income elasticities (speciﬁed by energy
carrier, sector, and climatic zone) results in a northward-
shifted and peaked latitudinal distribution of baseline future
energy demand (Fig. 1c). Across SSPs, energy demand is more
sensitive to income growth as compared to population expansion,
with the largest energy demand increases occurring in the rapid
economic growth SSP1 and SSP5 scenarios.
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Current global energy demand is concentrated in the high per-
capita income, high-population density areas of temperate
regions, especially Western Europe, United States, Japan, and
China. Baseline ﬁnal energy demand grows by a factor of 1.4–2.7
for industrialized regions, with more rapid growth in China
(Table 1). Conversely, the tropics are home to developing
economies that are poorer and consume far less energy, but
whose population, income, and energy demand all increase
signiﬁcantly under the SSP scenarios. Energy demand in tropical
developing regions grows by a factor of 2–4. Globally, 2050
baseline energy demand is two to three times larger than today
(Table 1), or an increase from 137 EJ of climate-exposed ﬁnal
energy use in 2010 to 234–388 EJ by mid-century (see
Supplementary Table 1).
Impacts of climate change. We determine the climatic shocks
by combining temperature elasticities from DCSW24 with
the change between now and 2050 for spatial population and
the number of hot and cold days from the current mean climate
under two emission scenarios: RCPs 4.5 and 8.525–27. We
use downscaled and bias-corrected simulations of all 21 Earth
System Models (ESMs) that participated in the Coupled Model
Intercomparison Project, Phase V (CMIP5) (see the “Methods”
section)33,34.
CMIP5 projections of temperature around 2050 show pro-
nounced increases in hot days throughout the tropics, especially
in the southern hemisphere. The median annual increase in
the tropics is around 100 hot days (Fig. 1d and Supplementary
Fig. 6). The mid-latitudes experience increases in the number
of hot days that are much smaller, but still double their
exposure compared with the present climate. Declines in
exposure to <12.5 °C days are concentrated in the mid-
latitudes, especially in the northern hemisphere, but these
changes are much smaller in both relative and absolute
magnitude (Fig. 1e and Supplementary Fig.6). Owing to the
northerly skewed distribution of population, current, and
future baseline energy demand, climatic changes exert impacts
that are potentially large and of opposite sign compared to
socioeconomic forces.
Over the period 2010–2050, the largest increases in baseline
ﬁnal energy demand occur in heavily populated tropical and mid-
latitude areas exposed up to 75 (50) additional hot days and up
to 40 (30) fewer cold days under vigorous (moderate) warming
(Fig. 2 and Supplementary Fig. 7). This expansion is the largest
for areas experiencing small changes in hot or cold days (<10),
reﬂecting the fact that at mid-century, most grid cells experience
only modest changes in temperature, especially under the
moderate RCP 4.5 scenario. The SSP-speciﬁc multi-ESM means
(Fig. 2c, d, g, h) suggest that socioeconomic forces shift this
pattern monotonically, with the largest (smallest) absolute
quantity of energy demand exposed under the rapid economic
growth (population growth) SSP5 (SSP3) scenario. Patterns of
exposure vary markedly among climate model realizations
(Fig. 2a, b, e, f).
Changes in energy demand due to warmer temperatures shift
the baseline exposure patterns (Fig. 2, brown lines). The total
demand rises with increased frequency of hot days (with the
largest effects arising for 15–70 additional days) and falls with
reduced frequency of cold days (with the largest effects arising
for declines of fewer than 10 cold days). The net impact is
ampliﬁcation of global energy demand by an amount that is an
order of magnitude smaller than the socioeconomically driven
increases in energy demand (Table 1), at the median of our ESM
ensemble, adding 37% (20%) or 90–131 (48–67) EJ/yr by 2050
under RCP 8.5 (RCP 4.5). Across 21 ESM and 5 SSP realizations,
net effects are uniformly positive but differ widely in magnitude,
with a global interquartile range of 25–58% (11–27%) under RCP
8.5 (RCP 4.5).
Underlying these aggregate changes are shifts in the various
sectors’ demands for different energy carriers (Fig. 3 and
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Fig. 1 Changes in the main drivers of energy demand between 2010 and
2050. The data are smoothed and summarized by latitude: population (a),
GDP per capita (b), baseline projections of the total climate-related ﬁnal
energy demand without climate-change impacts as a result of combining
our elasticities with GDP and population projections (c) number of days
with daily average temperature above 27.5 °C (d), number of days with
daily average temperature below 12.5 °C (e) under RCP 8.5. Supplementary
Fig. 6 provides a version of this ﬁgure for RCP 4.5
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Supplementary Fig. 8). The most important contributors to
changes in global demand are industry and services (both net
positive). The contributions of residences and especially agricul-
ture are small and net negative. For residence, this is due to the
lack of signiﬁcant elasticities in our data set. For agriculture, this
differs from the scarce existing literature6, as we include multiple
energy carriers that change in opposite directions. Electricity
demand expands in every sector. Commercial electricity accounts
for 80% of the global total climate-driven energy demand
increase. Sectoral changes in natural gas demand are small and
offset one another (positive in industry and negative in house-
holds). These impacts differ only slightly across socioeconomic
scenarios, with households and services exhibiting the largest
variation. Differences among ESM realizations (Fig. 3, error bars)
are much larger. The cross-ESM distributions of demand impacts
for industry, services, and the economy-wide total are long-
tailed—particularly for electricity relative to other energy
carriers—with a small number of climate model projections
accounting for large increases in demand. The balance between
increased cooling demand and decreased heating demand
determines the net impact at the regional scale (see Supplemen-
tary Tables 2 and 3 for details). For Europe, the heating effect
(RCP 4.5: −9 to 11%, RCP 8.5: −11 to14%) dominates the
cooling effect (RCP 4.5: 4%, RCP 8.5: 10–12%), yielding a net
decrease in the total ﬁnal energy demand under moderate
warming and a small net positive or negative impact under
vigorous warming. In all other regions, climate change increases
the total ﬁnal energy use, with a 75th percentile impact between
45 and 75% across sectors and energy carriers in the Americas,
the Middle East, and Asia under vigorous warming (Table 1).
ESMs agree that large areas of the world are likely to experience
ﬁnal energy demand increases of up to 10% by 2050 under
RCP 8.5 and SSP5 (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Fig. 9). While
increases of >50% are conﬁned to the tropics and the southern
parts of the United States, there is substantial agreement that
Southern Europe and China experience increases of >25%.
There is consensus among ESMs that the total ﬁnal energy use
declines in Northern Europe, Russia, western Canada, and the
United States, broad agreement on reductions of up to 10% in
Northern Russia, the United Kingdom, and Patagonia, and no
agreement that the total energy demand will decline by more than
25% in any part of the world. The differences in these spatial
patterns among the SSP scenarios are minor.
Implications for societal vulnerability and inequality. We
combine the spatial population projections for the SSPs with the
changes described above to characterize the distribution of vul-
nerable populations to the impacts of climate change on energy
demand (Fig. 5 and Supplementary Fig. 3). Impacts exhibit
substantial variation across energy carriers and sectors (Supple-
mentary Figs. 1, 2). Regarding the total ﬁnal energy demand, a
minority of the world’s population experiences modest (0–10%)
declines (mostly in Russia, Western Europe, Canada, and Chile/
Argentina) and the majority faces modest (0–25%) increases, with
about 30% of people experiencing substantial increases (of >25%)
over a very wide range. The longest tails of the distribution are for
electricity demand and for the commercial and industrial sectors.
This pattern shifts only slightly across SSPs, with the biggest
changes being the absolute level of the population. Higher
radiative forcing lengthens the impact distribution’s upper tail
and increases its inter-model dispersion.
Although the aggregate population distributions of impact
exposures vary only slightly across socioeconomic scenarios, they
vary markedly when populations are stratiﬁed by income level
(as deﬁned by the World Bank, see Supplementary Note 2),
which we take as an indicator of the capacity to adapt to changing
circumstances. The exposure of populations in countries at
different average per-capita income levels varies widely across the
SSPs (Fig. 5; Supplementary Fig. 3). By 2050, all countries exceed
the World Bank’s low-income threshold; in the high economic
growth SSP1 and SSP5 scenarios, almost all of the world’s
population lives in countries with per-capita GDP above its upper
Table 1 Changes in energy demand
SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5
A. Ratio of 2050:2010 energy demand
Europe 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.7 2.5
North America 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.8 2.4
Oceania 2.1 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.7
South America 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.4
Middle East and Africa 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.3 3.0
Asia 2.8 2.3 1.9 2.2 3.4
World 2.3 2.0 1.7 2.0 2.8
B. Climate-driven change in 2010–2050 energy demand growth, RCP 8.5 (%)
Europe –1% [–5%, 4%] 0% [–4%, 7%] 1% [–2%, 11%] –1% [–4%, 7%] –3% [–6%, 1%]
North America 64% [53%, 82%] 64% [53%, 82%] 63% [52%, 81%] 63% [52%, 82%] 63% [51%, 80%]
Oceania 28% [19%, 41%] 28% [19%, 41%] 29% [19%, 41%] 28% [19%, 41%] 28% [18%, 41%]
South America 33% [23%, 50%] 36% [25%, 55%] 39% [29%, 60%] 37% [26%, 56%] 30% [20%, 46%]
Middle East and Africa 37% [29%, 57%] 39% [30%, 58%] 38% [30%, 56%] 39% [30%, 57%] 37% [28%, 55%]
Asia 50% [28%, 72%] 52% [31%, 76%] 54% [33%, 79%] 52% [31%, 77%] 48% [27%, 70%]
World 36% [27%, 54%] 37% [29%, 56%] 39% [30%, 58%] 37% [28%, 56%] 34% [25%, 51%]
C. Climate-driven change in 2010–2050 energy demand growth, RCP 4.5 (%)
Europe –5% [–6%, –4%] –3% [–5%, –3%] –3% [–4%, –2%] –4% [–5%, –3%] –6% [–7%, –5%]
North America 31% [22%, 46%] 31% [22%, 46%] 31% [22%, 45%] 31% [22%, 45%] 30% [21%, 44%]
Oceania 8% [6%, 13%] 9% [6%, 13%] 9% [7%, 14%] 8% [6%, 13%] 8% [5%, 13%]
South America 15% [13%, 23%] 16% [15%, 25%] 19% [16%, 28%] 17% [15%, 25%] 13% [12%, 20%]
Middle East and Africa 21% [14%, 23%] 22% [15%, 24%] 21% [15%, 24%] 22% [15%, 24%] 20% [13%, 22%]
Asia 25% [15%, 36%] 26% [17%, 38%] 28% [18%, 39%] 27% [17%, 39%] 23% [14%, 34%]
World 19% [12%, 25%] 20% [13%, 27%] 21% [14%, 28%] 20% [13%, 27%] 18% [11%, 24%]
Baseline change in climate-related ﬁnal energy demand by 2050 for all SSPs compared with 2010 without accounting for climate impacts (part A) and additional change in energy demand due to climate
change under RCP 8.5 (part B) and RCP 4.5 (part C). Parts B and C show the median and interquartile range of all 21 CMIP5 models
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middle- or high-income thresholds. Regions with a preponder-
ance of lower middle-income countries face signiﬁcant adaptation
challenges under SSP2 (Asia), SSP3 (Asia, South America, Africa,
and Middle East), and SSP4 (Asia, Africa, and Middle East). In
the Middle East and Africa, 147–446 million inhabitants of
nations facing high-adaptation challenges experience increases in
the total ﬁnal energy use of 25–50%, and 117–341 million
experience increases of >50% under SSP2, 3, or 4. In Asia, the
corresponding ﬁgures are smaller: 7–67 million and 38–66
million, respectively (Supplementary Tables 4 and 5). Moderate
warming under RCP 4.5 scales down the overall distribution of
people exposed to increased energy demand.
Discussion
Across the four economic sectors and three energy carriers, cli-
mate change increases the world’s total ﬁnal energy demand at
mid-century by 11–27% (25–58%) under moderate (vigorous)
warming on top of socioeconomic developments. As our study is
the ﬁrst with global comprehensive coverage across four major
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Fig. 2 The total energy demand exposed to changes in cold and hot days. The upper half displays the results for RCP 8.5, the bottom half for RCP 4.5. In the
detailed panels (a, b, e, f) the blue lines depict present-day energy demand, and the red lines depict SSP5 baseline energy demand for 2050; brown lines
indicate energy use under SSP5 after impacts of climate change (mean and all 21 individual ESMs) exposed to changes in hot and cold days. Aggregate
panels (c, d, g, h) show the multi-ESM mean for all ﬁve SSPs. Impacts from climate change are only shown for changes in hot (b, d, f, h) or cold (a, c, e, g)
days; combined impacts are shown in Supplementary Fig. 7
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sectors, comparison with the literature can only be done on the
sectoral or regional level. Moreover, the wide distribution across
ESMs in our results implies that any comparison of future
climate-change impacts based on a subset of climate models
represents just a single data point in a distribution.
Starting with the sectoral dimension, the few existing global-
scale studies focus on the residential sector and conﬁrm our
ﬁnding that warming will reduce overall global energy use for
residential space conditioning by 205016,17 (though this trend
reverses itself by 2100 when temperature increases are larger).
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Fig. 3 Global total energy demand ampliﬁcation from climate change around 2050 under RCP 8.5. Solid bars represent the median of 21 ESM model
simulations, error bars represent the interquartile range of change in energy demand across 21 ESM simulations (see Supplementary Fig. 8 for RCP 4.5 results)
Agreement on total energy demand decline
a
<0%
b
>0%
c
<–10%
d
>10%
e
<–25%
f
>25%
g
<–50%
h
>50%
210 210
Agreement on total energy demand increase
Fig. 4 Agreement across ESMs on changes in ﬁnal energy demand. Maps depict the number of climate models that agree on decreases and increases in
total energy demand across sectors and energy carriers by more than 0% (a, b), 10% (c, d), 25% (e, f), or 50% (g, h) by 2050 under RCP 8.5 and SSP5, as
a result of temperature projections and changes in both hot and cold days (see Supplementary Fig. 9 for RCP 4.5 results)
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More recent global studies projecting future energy demand
pathways for the (broader deﬁned) building sector point at resi-
dential space cooling as a key driver for the projected net increase
in ﬁnal energy demand across different SSPs7. In our ﬁndings, the
commercial and industrial sectors are the dominant drivers of
energy demand increases. By considering a broader range of
energy-using sectors, we highlight the potentially important
impacts of commercial and industrial adaptation to climate
change, which has only been explored for speciﬁc regions4,35–38
by few studies that conﬁrm the potentially large impacts of these
sectors.
Despite regional variation in outcomes, we ﬁnd a pervasive
increase in the demand for electricity to satisfy increased cooling
needs in multiple sectors. For Europe, a north–south gradient of
impacts of opposing sign generates a median 2% net reduction in
the total ﬁnal energy, on par with the ﬁndings of fuel-speciﬁc
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Fig. 5 Exposure of people with different adaptation challenges to changes in energy demand. Cumulative distribution of the number of people exposed to
percentage change in climate-related ﬁnal energy demand by country GDP per capita. Panels represent global results (a) and three major developing world
regions: Asia (b), South America (c), and Middle East and Africa (d). Lines indicate the multi-model mean and all individual 21 CMIP5 models by 2050
under RCP 8.5. Present-day World Bank deﬁnitions for GDP per capita were used to classify countries in income categories, which we used as a proxy for
adaptation challenges (GDP per capita <6000 USD/yr for high-adaptation challenge, 6000–15,000 USD/yr for moderate-adaptation challenge, and
>15,000 USD/yr for low-adaptation challenge, see Supplementary Note 2 for detailed discussion). Supplementary Fig. 3 presents a version of this ﬁgure for
RCP 4.5 and Supplementary Figs 1, 2 present the results by sector and fuel
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studies17,39–41. In the United States, electricity use for cooling
drives a net positive increase in ﬁnal energy that, while not
detected by earlier multi-fuel studies4,37,42, is qualitatively in line
with recent electricity-focused analyses43–46. Our disaggregated
elasticities by sector and fuel also yield different results. As our
elasticity for commercial electricity demand is very sensitive to
hot days (Table 2), our increases in the aggregated total electricity
consumption for the United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin
America, exceed existing projections that use elasticities based on
country-speciﬁc aggregated total electricity load5,17,41,47,48.
Our impact projections, although comprehensive, are limited
by the quantity and quality of the data available to undertake a
global analysis. Similar to other existing empirical studies, we
could not identify signiﬁcant temperature elasticities for several
combinations of energy carriers, sectors, and climatic zones (see
Table 2), most importantly residential electricity use in tropical
areas in response to changes in hot days. We do ﬁnd that
developing countries’ per-capita income growth drives substantial
extensive-margin investments in energy-using durable goods,
particularly residential air conditioning5,17. However, by treating
the effect of future air-conditioning penetration as orthogonal to
temperature responses, our methodology ignores the possibility
that this higher level of air-conditioning adoption can further
amplify the growth in electricity demand with climate
change17,24,49.
An important caveat to our results is the limitations of the
empirical energy demand elasticities on which we base our pro-
jections. The ﬁnest-resolution internationally comparable energy-
use data are the annual records of International Energy Agency
(IEA) member countries. This presents an unavoidable trade-off
between scope and ﬁdelity, as top–down empirical climate
responses constructed from these data have the geographic and
sectoral coverage necessary to construct coarse-scale global pro-
jections of impacts, but struggle to replicate the ﬁne spatial-,
temporal scale of bottom-up local demand responses captured by
empirical studies that employ subnational data over limited
geographical domains41,46,49,50. In DCSW, IEA annual national
fuel consumption observations in 204 countries over the years
1978–2010 are regressed on population-weighted national aver-
age exposure to numbers of days in different average temperature
intervals. The resulting estimates are potentially subject to spatial
and temporal aggregation bias. Large countries that span different
climatic zones or incorporate regions that vary in the size and
characteristics of stocks of energy-using durables (e.g., air con-
ditioners, insulation) exhibit heterogeneous local energy demand
responses to temperature. DCSW’s estimates represent the mean
within-country response that is a weighted average of these
effects. By exploiting very large samples of high-frequency data,
other studies41,46,49,50 are also better able to capture the nonlinear
response of energy demand to temperature with greater ﬁdelity,
by statistically identifying the distinct marginal effects of exposure
to many temperature intervals—but over restricted geographic
domains (California zip codes, US regions, Mexican munici-
palities, or EU countries). By contrast, IEA data’s coarse resolu-
tion only permits identiﬁcation of the effects of days with average
temperatures of <12.5 °C and >27 °C, with each additional hot
day or cold day having the same effect, irrespective of how far
into the tails of the temperature it happened to be.
Table 2 Long-run estimated semi-elasticities and elasticities of energy demand to temperature and GDP per capita from
DCSW24
Error-correction model First differences Static
Response
to cold
days (T <
12.5 °C)
Response to
hot days
(T > 27.5 °C)
Log real
per-capita
GDP
elasticity
Response
to cold
days (T <
12.5 °C)
Response to
hot days
(T > 27.5 °C)
Log real
per-capita
GDP
elasticity
Response
to cold
days (T <
12.5 °C)
Response to
hot days
(T > 27.5 °C)
Log real
per-capita
GDP
elasticity
Temperate regions
Agriculture Electricity 0.009 0.645 0.001 0.498 0.013 –0.448
Natural gas –0.019 1.320 0.002 1.659 0.002 1.386
Petroleum –0.013
Commercial Electricity –0.006 0.047 0.864 0.000 0.001 0.491 0.001 0.010 0.458
Natural gas 0.970 1.036 0.608
Petroleum 0.012 –0.795 0.002 0.825 0.004 1.524
Industrial Electricity 0.009 0.363 0.000 0.867 0.003 0.539
Natural gas 0.033 0.000 0.014
Petroleum –1.089 1.071 0.240
Residential Electricity 0.015 0.366 0.002 0.116 0.010 0.376
Natural gas 0.023 1.433 0.002 0.692 0.002 0.963
Petroleum 0.021 0.001 0.005
Tropical regions
Agriculture Electricity –0.008 –0.701 –0.005 –0.025 –0.012 0.542
Natural gas
Petroleum 0.066 0.000 0.009
Commercial Electricity 0.008 0.703 0.000 0.190 0.002 0.415
Natural gas 0.004 0.002
Petroleum –0.014 –0.017 –0.001 -0.005 –0.031 –0.012
Industrial Electricity –0.028 0.008 0.478 –0.002 0.001 0.496 –0.005 –0.002 0.464
Natural gas 0.010 0.002 0.015
Petroleum 0.005 0.001 0.002
Residential Electricity 1.287 0.256 0.518
Natural gas
Petroleum
All estimates are signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level. Insufﬁcient observations for the missing fuel, sector, region combinations. This study uses the estimates from the error-correction model
speciﬁcation
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Notwithstanding these limitations, the demand for electricity
that is a key driver of our projected impacts exhibits localized,
high temporal frequency responses, whose shape can be well
approximated by linear schedules outside of an intermediate
moderate temperature range46. We exploit this property to
reconcile top–down and bottom-up estimates of the response of
annual electricity demand to warming (see Supplementary
Note 3). Local conditional mean energy demand and the fraction
of demand that is sensitive to variations in weather are crucial
determinants of local impacts. However, these are not observed
for the various fuel × sector combinations in grid cells across the
world, and our projection methodology assumes that over the
long run, all energy demand is responsive to temperature. This
assumption likely overestimates the response of demand to
warming, but lack of availability of local data makes it impossible
to assess the magnitude and geographic distribution of the
resulting bias. Our ﬁndings should thus be interpreted as worst-
case projections of the impact of a given amount of warming,
especially in tropical and subtropical regions that see large
increases in extreme high-temperature days.
Our work shows that it is possible to identify a globally com-
prehensive relationship between temperature and energy, and
what the potential consequences would be in the light of climatic
and socioeconomic uncertainties, but also shows that better data
availability would greatly enhance this work. Strengthening the
empirical basis for global-scale projections of energy impact thus
necessitates fundamental advances in the data collection.
Compared with impacts constructed at the mean of multiple
ESM realizations of future climate change14,41,46, our explicit
consideration of uncertainty yields important insights, especially
for policy makers. Although the lower tail of the RCP8.5 dis-
tribution of shocks to the global total ﬁnal energy demand
overlaps the upper tail of the RCP4.5 distribution (cf Table 1),
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests conﬁrm that the two densities differ.
As early as mid-century, there can be beneﬁts to mitigating cli-
mate change (t tests indicate a statistically signiﬁcant 14–20%
difference in the means of the distributions), but the associated
costs depend critically on the uncertain greenhouse gas
intensity of electricity generation that satisﬁes the anticipated
large increases in future demand. Such increased electricity
consumption does not translate one-to-one in carbon emissions,
as, depending on the merit order, higher or lower carbon-
intense electricity production technologies might be dominant.
Similarly, adapting to an uncertain climate poses a monumental
challenge to energy supply and infrastructure development
planning: for RCP 8.5 (RCP 4.5), worst-case ampliﬁcation
among the CMIP5 ESMs of the 2010–2050 change in ex-ante
total ﬁnal energy demand is 150% (41%) globally, and across
regions, 265% (68%), concentrated in Asia, generally in line with
the recent IEA cooling demand outlook3. Such uncertainties,
stemming from the ensemble of ESMs, dwarf the uncertainties in
percentage and absolute impacts due to differences in sectoral
composition of countries’ energy systems under the various
SSPs (Fig. 3).
Urbanization is implicit in our methodology, as future tem-
perature ﬁelds are population-weighted, and the spatial dis-
tribution of population varies across SSPs along with country-
level population trends, which do play a large role in the
underlying SSP projections. Across the SSPs, urbanization levels
vary widely51, with low urbanization in SSP3 and high urbani-
zation in SSP1 and SSP5. Urbanization drives the location of
population in the SSP spatial population projections, where they
are allocated from the national level to individual grid cells. In our
projections, urbanization determines to which temperature
changes people are exposed, and temperature changes in urban
grid cells are more dominant in higher-urbanization scenarios.
Future climate change is likely to affect energy use in the
transport sector as well, but as suggested in DCSW, the under-
lying drivers remain opaque. On the one hand, people occupying
vehicles modify cooling and heating while driving to maintain
thermal comfort. On the other hand, when faced with extreme
cold or hot weather conditions, they might simply make different
mobility choices (e.g., drive more, or do not drive at all). Weather
traditionally does not enter the model of the demand for trans-
portation, and temperature-related energy use is marginal for
transportation purposes. Since our projection methodology can-
not discern the fraction of energy that is sensitive to variations in
weather, we focus on the ﬁnal sectors where temperature more
directly affects the climate-sensitive energy use. The dynamics of
the transport sector are more complex and sub-sector-speciﬁc
(e.g., fright transport would have different dynamics compared
with personal mobility choices. In the residential sector demand
for mobility, services would also interact with leisure-labor
choices), calling for dedicated studies ﬁrst identifying the
underlying mechanisms at play, and subsequently evaluating
them empirically.
We conclude by emphasizing that our results indicate the
potential, ex-ante impacts of climate change, prior to any direct
or indirect adaptation measures23, representing the ﬁrst step of a
full-impact analysis. The present impact estimates are key inputs
to the Integrated Assessment Model or CGE model simulations,
which can examine the shifts in economic structure or technology
between socioeconomic and climate scenarios driven by our
ex ante shocks. Rebound effects and price changes will also
dampen the consequent changes energy demand, further inﬂu-
encing the gap between our projections and ex post outcomes52.
Given these considerations, our ﬁndings should be interpreted
not as future physical changes in energy use, but as the changes in
demand that, without price, substitution, and induced technical
change adjustments, would maintain the level of economic ser-
vices delivered by energy systems in the baseline scenario, if they
were subjected to temperature shocks. Within CGE models, a
practical way to operationalize such impacts could be technolo-
gical shift parameters that lower the productivity of energy inputs
to sectoral economic activities by the warranted percentage
increase in energy demand, and vice versa. Induced technological
change could then be modeled as a structural process that gen-
erates ex post modiﬁcations of such productivity shifts, following
the practices of bottom-up approaches.
The emission consequences of our projected climate-driven
expansion of global fossil fuel demand give rise to a fundamental
tension between mitigating and adapting to higher temperatures.
Follow-up investigations using IAM simulations to characterize
the balance of these forces and its implications for the joint costs
of mitigation and adaptation have just started to appear in the
literature53. Empirically based, global-scale probabilistic impact
projections of the kind reported here are critical to catalyzing
synergistic research throughout the broader integrated assessment
community.
Methods
Empirical approach. Our methodology is based on DCSW24, the relation to which
is summarized in Fig. 6. DCSW24 derived econometric estimates of per-capita
demand for three different ﬁnal energy carriers associated with heating and cooling
in four economic sectors for temperate and tropical countries as a function of per-
capita gross domestic product (GDP) and exposure to hot (>27.5 °C) and cold
(<12.5 °C) days. The methodology applied in DCSW24 is detailed in this section.
This study combines their elasticities, βY (income) and βT (temperature), with a
large set of future changes in income and temperatures. In the ﬁrst step, we
combine the income elasticities with population and GDP projections from the
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) to construct ﬁve scenarios of baseline
global energy demand in 2050 without climate-change impacts. In the second step,
we impose climatic shocks derived from 21 Earth System Models and 2 emission
scenarios (RCPs) on top of the baseline scenarios by combining temperature
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elasticities with the 2050 present difference in spatial population and hot and cold
days from the current mean climate.
We use long-run income elasticities and temperature semi-elasticities estimated
by DCSW24 to explore uncertainty in projected energy demand impacts across a
range of climate models and socioeconomic scenarios. DCSW24 uses unbalanced
panel data of energy demand, income per capita, prices, and weather covariates for
204 countries over the period 1970–2014 (see detailed references in DCSW24) to
estimate income elasticities and temperature semi-elasticities of sectoral energy
demand across two regions (temperate, tropical), three energy carriers (electricity,
natural gas, and petroleum products), and four sectors (residential, commercial,
industry, and agriculture). Differently from the customary approach used in the
climate-economy literature12, DCSW24 models, the relationship between energy
demand, weather, income, and prices as a dynamic adjustment process. The
adjustment in energy demand following a shock is not immediate, because of
capital ﬁxity and adjustments in expectations. At each point in time, changes in
energy demand are a function of weather, income, and price shocks, as well as of
the adjustment process induced by shocks that took place in the previous period
(year). Adjustments in energy use to price, income, and weather shocks occur over
time, in line with studies ﬁnding evidence of persistency12,54. DCSW estimates the
model as a dynamic panel using an Error-Correction Model (ECM), which yields
short- and long-run elasticities. Over the long run, adjustments on the extensive
margin (e.g., purchase of air conditioners, improvements in energy efﬁciency) also
affect the use of energy, and this additional effect is being captured by the long-run
elasticities, which we use here in this paper. The ECM can also be represented as an
Autoregressive-Distributed-Lag model, and it also allows obtaining statistical
inference that is robust to nonstationary data. Long-run estimates can be seen as a
weighted average of elasticities estimated in the ﬁrst difference or using a static
model (Hendry, 199555, see also Table 2).
Table 2 summarizes the estimated elasticities from the error-correction model
(ECM) speciﬁcation as reported in DCSW24 and compares them with elasticities
obtained from the static and ﬁrst-difference speciﬁcations. The semi-elasticities
to temperature bins reported in Table 2 suggest that temperature change has an
inﬂuence on energy demand in 16 out of 24 energy carrier, sector, region
combinations. Temperature semi-elasticities indicate that energy carrier demands
tend to increase with hot days with a magnitude that varies among energy carriers
and sectors. Responses to hot and cold days are asymmetric, and depending on
whether an energy carrier is mostly used for heating or cooling, response in one or
both directions can be signiﬁcant. Several semi-elasticities to cold days are negative,
suggesting that extreme cold weather could reduce energy demand, especially in
production processes in industry and agriculture. The negative estimates can be
due to reduced energy consumption for cooling or irrigation during the shoulder
seasons of spring and fall (e.g., reduction in electricity use in commercial activities,
industry, and agriculture), or to fuel switching (e.g., from petroleum products to
electricity in the commercial sector in the tropics). An increase in cold days can
temporarily induce production activities to reduce their electricity demand and/or
temporarily shift to cheaper sources such as natural gas. Moreover, commercial and
industrial consumers may also have back-up energy generation.
In this paper, we use the historical evidence on energy use over a period of
about 30 years summarized in Table 2 as an analog of how we might use energy in
the future over the next 30 years to generate a set of counterfactual scenarios aimed
at exploring climate and socioeconomic uncertainty. Because the elasticities for
cold and hot days are estimated individually, future impacts in response to changes
in both hot and cold days can be reported individually or combined.
Baseline projections. To establish mid-century baseline energy demand in the
absence of climate change, we applied income elasticities from DCSW24 to the
increases in countries’ GDP per capita from 2010 to 2050 corresponding to each
Shared Socioeconomic Pathway (SSP) scenario, generating energy carrier x sector
consumption growth factors that were used to scale each sector’s per-capita energy
demand from its 2010 level. The resulting country-wide average values of per-
capita demand for the three energy carriers by four sectors were then combined
with gridded maps of future population under the SSPs to yield projected levels of
energy demand across the globe on a 0.25° grid. Due to the lack of information for
spatial distribution of energy demands, the energy demand in each grid cell is
simply the national average energy demand per capita multiplied by the population
in the grid cell.
The Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) that we used in this research have
been developed by the climate research community as common basis across
mitigation and impact research28. The SSPs have diverging narratives that describe
how these worlds evolve into high or low challenges to mitigation or adaptation29.
SSP1 represents a world with low socioeconomic challenges to both adaptation and
mitigation. In SSP2, intermediate progresses have been made, and both adaptation
and mitigation challenges remain at a medium level, whereas SSP3 represents a
future with high challenges on both dimensions. In SSP4 and SSP5, adaptation or
mitigation challenges dominate respectively. Several key variables have been
projected forward for each of the SSPs. In this paper, we use SSP projections of
future spatial population change30,56 and GDP growth for 183 countries57. A global
summary of population and GDP of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways is shown
in Table 3 to indicate the wide variation between SSPs. There is some debate on
whether each of the ﬁve SSPs can actually be combined with all levels of climate
change from the Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) (for details, see
Figure 8 in Riahi et al.58). This is especially relevant for the highest-emission
scenario, RCP8.5, which can only be reached under SSP5. However, the widest
diversion between scenarios, both for the SSPs and the RCPs, takes place in the
second half of the 21st century. In this paper, we only focus on results for mid-
century, a period for which the potential inconsistency between SSPs and RCPs is
much less clear. Moreover, we only use GDP and population from the SSPs and
whether the projections for economy and population of 2050 are inconsistent with
RCP8.5 levels of warming, is still an open question. Finally, in the structure of our
impact analysis, the main difference between the SSPs are different distributions of
population over the planet (i.e., different countries have higher/lower population
growth) and different sectoral composition of energy demand, due to differences in
economic growth. These are both relevant uncertainties to explore in the context of
this impact study, and both these issues are not the main uncertainties with respect
to (in-)consistency between the SSPs and RCP8.5.
Six Integrated Assessment Modeling (IAM) teams have published energy
demand projection for the SSPs58. The methods used by these models are
fundamentally different from our econometric approach. IAMs provide simpliﬁed
representations of human and natural systems and integrate the energy systems in
the macroeconomic system. Our econometric elasticities do not capture large
structural changes in the economy or changes in energy demand patterns over
different stages of development. Supplementary Figs. 4 and 5 show a comparison
between the range of IAM quantiﬁcations of the SSPs and our econometric method
(red dots) for each sector, energy carrier combination for the years 2010
(Supplementary Fig. 4) and 2050 (Supplementary Fig. 5).
Because the SSP quantiﬁcations of the IAMs are only publicly available for
aggregated sectors and regions, we merged our residential and commercial sectors
into a single-building sector. Also, there is no SSP information available on the
agriculture sector, so we could not make that comparison. For some sector x energy
De Cian and Sue Wing24
By sector, fuel, temperate/tropical.
Based on 204 countries, 1970–2014.
Empirical model for:
Energy demand as
function of:
GDP
temperature
This study
future projections of:
GDP (5 SSPs)
population (5 SSPs)
Temperature change
(21 ESMs, 2 RCPs)
Baseline projections
Climate change impacts
Y
T
Fig. 6 Brief overview of the methodology of this study and its relation to De Cian and Sue Wing (2018). De Cian and Sue Wing (2018) estimated elasticities
of energy use with changes in temperature (βT) and GDP per capita (βY). This study combines these elasticities with GDP and population projections for
the SSPs to establish baseline projection and with temperature projections from 21 climate models to analyze climate change impacts
Table 3 Key global characteristics of the SSP quantiﬁcations
for population, GDP, and GDP per capita
Indicator Year SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4 SSP5
Population
(million persons)
2010 6844 6844 6844 6844 6844
2050 8434 9137 9920 9095 8532
GDP (trillion
USD2010)
2010 67 67 67 67 67
2050 285 230 177 219 361
GDP per capita
(USD2010)
2010 9763 9763 9763 9763 9763
2050 33,742 25,142 17,871 24,104 42,303
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carrier combinations, we could not estimate statistically signiﬁcant elasticities, and
therefore our method does not project any change from today’s level, with future
projections of GDP per capita (for instance, for petroleum products in the industry
and building sectors). For the largest (and for the fastest-growing) energy carrier x
sector combinations, such as electricity in buildings and industry, our baseline
demand projections are in line with IAM projections. For some others, such as
natural gas in buildings, our method assumes a tighter relation between energy
demand and GDP per capita compared with IAMs. For this comparison, it is also
important to note that there are some deﬁnitional differences for the base year
between the IAMs and our data, as can be seen in Supplementary Fig. 4.
Climate-change impacts. The last methodological step is calculating the effects of
mid-century climate change relative to the baseline. Our main data source is the
NASA Earth Exchange Global Daily Downscaled Projections (NEX-GDDP)34,
which tabulate bias-corrected daily maximum and minimum temperatures on a
0.25° grid over the 2006–2100 period for the RCP4.526 and RCP8.527 scenarios
simulated by 21 Earth System models participating in the global Climate Model
Intercomparison Project round 5 (CMIP5)33. The NASA-NEX-GDDP are both
bias correction as well as spatial downscaling of the CMIP5 data to a consistent
spatial grid. The bias correction is based on a statistical approach that compares
spatially explicit GCM output for a historical period to actual historic data to
compute an offset to shift the local GCM results. The spatial downscaling is a
combination of linear interpolation, with preservation of the spatial details of the
observational data. A detailed description of the NEX-GDDP data set can be found
in ref. 34 and https://nex.nasa.gov/nex/static/media/other/NEX-
GDDP_Tech_Note_v1_08June2015.pdf.
For each grid cell, we computed mean daily temperatures from the daily max
and min temperature provided by the NEX-GDDP data, and then sum the annual
days of exposure to average temperatures <12.5 °C and >27.5 °C. In our 2050 no
climate-change baseline scenario, each grid cell’s vector of temperature exposures
was assumed to remain at its 2006–2015 average value. To construct ensemble
projections of climate-change impact, we computed the difference between each
grid cell’s NEX-GDDP projected annual exposure and its baseline exposure over
the period 2040–2060 and combined the results with our empirically derived long-
run temperature elasticities of energy demand to generate gridded maps of annual
changes in energy carrier x sector energy demand, which were then averaged over
years to produce the effect of climate circa 2050.
Aggregating the results across energy carriers and sectors yields 21 ESM
realizations of future change in total ﬁnal energy demand for each of two RCP
scenarios and ﬁve SSP scenarios. The SSP scenarios were developed as discrete
storylines with no information as to their relative likelihood of occurrence;
accordingly, we treat energy demand under each SSP, as well as its potential to
generate a high or low trajectory of radiative forcing, separately. Within each
scenario combination, we treat each ESM’s gridded realization of temperature as an
independent draw from an unknown conditional probability distribution. The
realizations of 2050–2010 changes in temperature exposure, and concomitant
effects on energy demand, generated by our ESM ensemble can be weighted in any
number of ways59. The simplicity and transparency of the independence
assumption make it a useful jumping-off point for characterizing the risk of
climate-change impacts.
Data availability
The output data generated during our analyses and supporting the ﬁndings of this paper
are available in the IIASA DARE repository with access code 41: [https://dare.iiasa.ac.at/
41/]. This repository also contains R-scripts to regenerate all ﬁgures in this paper. The
input data used in this analysis are available at the following public locations: NASA-
NEX climate data: [https://cds.nccs.nasa.gov/nex-gddp/]. GDP and population for the
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways: [https://tntcat.iiasa.ac.at/SspDb]. Spatial population
projections for the SSPs: [https://doi.org/10.7927/H4RF5S0P].
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